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Is it possible to think a public space in such a way that its visitors
would not be merely impelled to occupy it as a ready-made site, but
would need to contribute to its invention or to countersign the project?
This initial question would not seek to verify the adequation oE a plan
with its actualization, where the plan would precede its concrete lay-
out. Attempts to assess whether the effect or use of a site correspond
to or depart from a previous plan proceed from the notion that a site
is a set of potentially interpretable encoded signs, which may be more
or less competently deciphered. What happens, however, when at its
inception, the very project of a public site puts into question access to
a readable interiority?l In other words, such a public project would be
rethinking the conditions of address and reception, and beyond that,
the function of the public space. Along with other disciplines or within
its own field, architecture has challenged the seeming self-evidence of
several of its axioms and effects, for example, architecture's embodi-
ment of a "metaphysics of presence and the present" (Grosz xiii), its
anthropocentrism-Peter Eisenman says that "the notion of the hu-
man body as the source-authority of scale" has to be subverted (Chora
L Works 71)-and its relation "to objects and primarily to solids" (Grosz
xxi). The extent to which many architects have sought of late to desta-
bilize functionality ll1 designs, "to transcend use" in Eisenman's words
(9), is indicative of a double reflection on space in general and on
specific forms of inhabitation in particular. At stake would be, as Eliza-
48
RHIZOME AND KHORA
beth Grosz argues, how to experienee spaee as "the ongoing possibil-
ity of a different inhabitation" (9), a formulation that deemphasizes
the primaey of the plan or the arehiteetural blueprints, aptly invokes
dynamism over stasis, and names beeoming over being.2
Two designs undertaken in Paris in the 1980s and 1990s (La
Villette and the Pare Andre Citroen) have arguably made the wager of
enaeting a projeet whieh defies the presenting or representing of a
prior eoneeption, ealling for the time of the not-yet (a question at the
limit of temporality), or oddly figuring the non-representable or the
non-plaee (a turn to another spatiality). The design of the master plan
of the park at La Villette was awarded to the arehiteet BernardTschumi
in 1983 and eompleted in 1995. At Tsehumi's invitation, Eisenman
andJaeques Derrida were asked to work together on one of la Villette's
gardens (Chora L Works 125). Independently of that projeet, Derrida
wrote an essay on Tsehumi's design, Pointde Folie -Maintenant l'architecture,
and in addition, his original eoilaboration with these arehiteets was
doeumented in Chora L Works. Unlike Tsehumi's plan, whieh preeeded
theirs, Eisenman/Derrida's design was ultimately not laid out, but as
we shall see, eongruenee between the two projeets is nevertheless
discernible, partly beeause Derrida's work has been a signifieant
referenee for Tsehumi as weil as for Eisenman. In addition, both
arehiteets have demonstrated an affinity for eertain forms, such as the
point grid structure, devised beforehand by Tschumi in London
('joyee's Garden'') and by Eisenman ("Cannaregio projeet'') in Veniee,
whieh motivated Tsehumi's invitation in the first plaee (Chora L Works
82-83).
Completed in 1993, the Pare Andre Citroen was designed by
two teams, the landscape arehitect Gilles Clement being entrusted the
north side of the park together with the arehiteet Patriek Berger. In his
writings on landscape and on this park in particular, Clement develops
a thinking of spaee that relies on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze
(and Felix Guattari). Grosz has evaluated in her work the possibility of
"the beeoming-philosophy of arehiteeture" being effeeted through "the
beeoming-arehiteeture of philosophy" (64). It is achallenging task to
whieh I hope to contribute in addressing the designs of La Villette and
the Pare Andre Citroen. But in addition to unfolding an "adhesion"-
Eisenman's word to deseribe his eoilaboration with Derrida (Chora L
Works 111)-betweenTsehumi/Eisenman/Derrida, on the one hand,
and Clement/Deleuze/Guattari, on the other, I also want to examine
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points of convergence between Deleuze and Derrida, which explains
why in my analysis, Tschumi's design can also be said to be in dialogue
with Deleuze, and Clement's with Derrida. Thus, my essay is inscribed
within the task of assessing the "nearly total affinity" (Derrida 2001),
which also implies-since Derrida qualifies "total" with "nearfy"-the
"point of diffraction" (Lawlor 124), between Derrida and Deleuze.3
On the one hand, I contend that the architects who are linked here
with these philosophers remarkably embodywhat defies representation,
such as Deleuze's ''becoming'' or Derrida's "beyond being" (m Lawlor's
formulation [136]). Furthermore, lexamine the ways in which what
has been gathered under the name "khora" in Derrida and "rhizome"
in Deleuze intersects and enables a different thought of the political.
Both khora and rhizome name places refractory to the proper, and
both give place to another thinking of the time/space of the political.
Both exceed all cosmologies, understood as discourses of origin and
structure, and both are deployed in relation to writing. It is the "zone
of proximity" CA Thousand Plateaus 273) of khora and rhizome that
will be under study.4 If "public space" primarily refers here to public
parks-and parks have always presupposed a political and philosophical
stance coextensive to them-it also points to a site where politics or
the public state of affairs (perhaps also res publica) might take place
othenvise. In that respect, both Tschumi and Clement are weil aware of
the legacy alandscape designer inherits today with a view of
transforming it. Under the heading, '~n Urban Park for the 21 st
Cen~"Tschumi objected in his competition document to Olmsted's
19th-century conception of a park excluding the city from its midst,
and mimicking nature. '~gainst passive 'esthetic' parks of repose;'
Tschumi advocates instead "new urban parks based on cultural
invention, education, and entertainment" (fschumi 2000, 55). As for
Clement, he interrogates the traditional attribution of the management
of the land to the gardener, investigating biodiversity and the
intervention of the visitor in a less controiled public space.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have spoken of their
collaboration, remarking for instance that "Since each of us was several,
there was already quite a crowd" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 3).
Coilaboration already takes each and every one of the participants
elsewhere than the place and time of the self-same and permanent
Subject, but it only is one indication among others, a symptom that
their thought does not operate from such apremise. In the working
50
RHIZOME AND KHORA
sessions about La Villette, Peter Eisenman points out that each
participant's text already was "a text on a text" (Chora L WOrks 33):
Derrida's Khora addressing Plato's Timaeus, and Eisenman's taking up
Derrida's text on a text.s Chora L Works dismisses the notion of a
textual commentary occasioned by an architectural project, in order to
promote a more unusual process by which "the project's only being"
would be constituted by what Eisenman calls a "registration" of these
former texts on texts within the project (33). When he adds that the
structure of registration is "analogie," however, has Eisenman not risked
reintroducing the possibility of chronology and of at least a metonymic
resemblance between texts and an architectural design? This question
is addressed by Derrida in Point de Folie, in which he cautions against an
understanding of Tschumi's designs as a mere "analogical transposition
or even an architectural application" of the language of deconstruction
(15). Derrida resists that notion, which to him is at all events inapplicable,
since "deconstructive strategies begin or end by destabilising exactly
the structural principle of architecture (system, architectonics, structure,
foundation, construction, etc.)" (15). Instead, he assesses Tschumi's
Folies of La Villette as "the obligatory route of deconstruction in one
of its most intense, affirmative and necessary implementations" (15).
In other words, as he also declares about the work of Eisenman, "if
deconstruction means sometl1ing or is at work somewhere, . . .it does
not consist only in semantic analysis, discursive statements but does
something... through that form of architecture" (Chora L WOrks 105).
In both cases, the affirmation in question is not only an analogical
vocabulary, but a constructive process operating a difference within
the very signs and forms of another discipline, here architecture.
If analogy remains part of the design of Eisenman/Derrida,
it is therefore not to be understood as a mere transcription by the
architect of the philosopher's discourse. It is also provoked by their
project of enacting a choric space in their assigned garden at La Villette.
As Derrida remarks in his essay on Plato's Timaeus, it is difficult to
foreclose entirely the question of analogy when addressing I<hora.
This failure to prevent it was anticipated by Plato, since analogy is in
effect not avoided in Timaeus itself, even though khora is also declared
there to exceed and precede the opposition between the sensible and
the intelligible, the proper and the figurative senses, etc., oppositions
which anchor the resource of, and recourse to analogy. It is as though
we did not have access to khora in our language,6 so no mere interpretive
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negligence contributes to inducing what Derrida calls "retrospective
projections" or "teleological retrospections" (Derrida 1995, 93) in the
cliscourse on khora. I<hora is not; it is not like anything, it "anachronizes
being" (94). Derrida shows that with a necessity so clifficult to escape,
the very cliscourse which attempts to comprehend or name khora tends
to fall back on markers which are anachronistic to it: figures like a
mother, a nurse, etc, are examples of I<hora's names found in Timaeus,
and repeated by Plato's interpreters (93). If it were possible to avoid
that anachronism, one would need to think Khora as ''before before"
(Chora L WOrks 35), that is to say, before any ''before'' can be opposed
to an "after," when these terms are not polarized, or are not yet. At
least two cliscourses are shown by Derrida to be inadequate to khora:
one is ontology, and the other is the recourse (one, that would, however,
tend to be "inevitable") to tropology and anachronism. Derrida
addresses both issues together when he considers another name given
to Khora in Timaeus, that of "receptacle" (Derrida 1995, 95). I<hora as
receptacle receives without possessing, and strangelygives place without
being affected by, owning, or having properly what takes place in it.
On the one hand, khora does not ''give place by receiving" (95), but it
''gives nothing," either, "in giving place or in giving to think" (96).7
"Receiving" and "giving" are to be read beyond the logic of the gift or
present, and that of the debt: "The expression 10 give place does not
refer to the gesture of a donor-subject, the support or origin of
somethingwhich would come to be given to someone" (100). Each of
these terms (the donor-subject as origin; the place as gift to be
deciphered and taken; the addressee in debt, receiving) is inadequate to
what takes place without reappropriation in Khora. Instead, khora is
the place of inclifference and impassivity: "Khora is not a subject...The
hermeneneutic types can inform, they can give form to khora only to
the extent that, inaccessible, impassive, 'amorphous' (amorphon, 51a)
and still virgin, with a virginity that is raclically rebellious against [rebelle
dJ anthropomorphism, it seems 10 receive these types andgiveplace to them.
But if Timaeus names it as receptacle (dekhomenon) or place (khOra),
these names do not designate an essence" (Derrida 95). I<hora "gives
place" from the position-which is not one-of a "non-place" (Chora
L Works34).
The Eisenman/Derrida project entails schematizing a process
of "registration" of Derrida's KhOra, by evincing in the project its very
lack of representabilit)T. While I<hora as such cannot give place to an
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arcbitecture, since it defies the "as such;' they propose instead that
"the non-representable space could give the receiver, the visitor, the
possibility of thinking about arcbitecture" (35). Something more or in
excess of a project wbich remains non-totalizable (34) would signal
and compel the visitor's countersignature and the advent of another
relation to time and space in and for the city. Put differently, this
corresponds to what Derrida expounds as "maintenanl' in bis essay on
Tschumi, Point de Folie. Left ll1 French by the translator, "maintenanl'
refers to a maintenance in the arcbitectural, but one that gives its due
within the work to dislocation, "implement[s] it as such in the space of
reassembly" (17), indicating as weil the imminence, the promise of an
event (5). In Chora L Works, Derrida also suggests that what maintains
arcbitecture "has to do with the signature, with the promise" (111).
How is it concretely approached in the Eisenman/Derrida
design? As a take on the "impossible surface" of Kh6ra (10), one of
the proposals that prevailed consisted in constructing a structure that
would "probibit access to the surface," but allow the visitor, through a
basement, to discern the surface as if it were a negative (92). Eisenman
states in that respect that glass "indexes an absence, a void in asolid
wall. Thus glass in arcbitecture is traditionally said to be both absence
and presence" (187). In the design, the public having access to the level
beneath, and being detoured thus from any other access to the garden,
would "see the inverse of everything: the surface as a ceiling and an of
the articulations, the solids and voids of the surface, in inverse" (91).
Let's note that this inversion or reversibility of features is also a
characteristic of Tschumi's design. Tbis is the case with the Folies, wbich
are recursive cubic structures of the same dimension regularly placed
according to a point-grid system (Tschumi 2000, 57). Yet none of
these structures is exactly the same, and their functional purpose is not
predetermined. By superimposing to this point grid two other systems
(lines and surfaces), Tschumi aimed to emphasize permutation and
substitution over a homogeneous whole (Tschumi 1987, VII), while
contesting the privilege of any organizing element (VI). In addition, if
any "analogy" was enabling bis project, Tschumi conceded that of
film: "the world of the cinemawas the first to introduce discontinuity-
a segmented world in which each fragment maintains its own
independence, thereby permitting a multiplicity of combinations (VI).
This is why Tschumi also referred to bis design at La Villette as "a
series of cinegrams" (VI). In that respect, one of the dismissed
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proposals of the Eisenman/Derrida project involved the recourse to
photography or video on the site (48), while retaining at the end, as I
have already mentioned, the notion of the "negative." With his Park
of cinegrams, Tschumi is also in proximi~though he never mentions
it explicitly; to Deleuze's work on the "movement-image," summarized
as "the acentered set of variable elements which act and react on each
other" (Deleuze 1997, 217). In anticipation of our turn to Deleuze, let
us note thatwith the movement-image, Deleuze, who compares great
cinema directors to architects and thinkers (xiv), is at work, as he often
is, on the middle by ascribing movenlent in cinema to the intermediate
image (2).
In what sense can it be said that khora provides another space
of, and for the political in Derrida's reading? To begin with, in Greek
the common noun khora includes "the sense of political place or,
more generally; of invested place" (Derrida 1995, 109). But Derrida
addresses the other political dimension of the unplaceable place (111)
by examining Socrates' position as to place in Timaeus. First, Derrida
shows that because he is the recipient, or, already in analogy with khora
as weil as commanded by the discourse on khora, the receptacle of the
narratives oE Critias and Timaeus, Socrates is ready to receive. On the
one hand, Socrates privileges the "situation, the relation to place" and
claims that "the absence of a proper place" prevents poets and sophists
"from understanding these men who, being philosophers and
politicians, have (a) place [ont lieu] , that is, act by means of gesture and
speech, in the city or at war" (107). But on the other hand, Socrates
excludes himself from the group belonging to a proper place, that is to
say, also from the political. He "operates from a sort of nonplace" but,
as Derrida says, in order to say to the other: ''You alone have place....
you have (a) place, have (a) place, come" (108). The ethical relation to
the other is not only one of dislocation and dispossession of the self,
but also the dislocation of the place as location. The non-place of
Socrates signals that of I<hora. I<hora gives thought to another site of
politics and politics of places, it gives a hospitable place to the other:
Have a place, come! Therefore, the non-representability or non-
presentation of the "registration" of KhOra in La Villette must be
understood in its political acuteness: the conditions for inhabiting this
locus, and the locus itsel~ are to be invented, in a way which will go
beyond debt and even beyond the reference to man's centrality. At this
point Derrida's thought on democracy as the to-come, as a "non-
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presentable concept" wruch belongs to the time of the promise (Derrida
1997, 339), can be articulated with that project. In Politics of Friendship,
Derrida wonders whether part of the inheritance of "democracy" can
be assumed in spite of, or against what has also in that name been
restricted to the regime of the "proper": ''What still remains or resists
in the deconstructed (or deconstructible) concept of democracy to
orient us without end? To order us not only to start a deconstruction
but to keep the old name? And still to deconstruct in the name of a
democrag to come? .. Would there still be in the concept of eudoxia
(reputation, approbation, opinion, judgment), and in the concept of
equality (equality of birth (isogonia) and equality of rights (isonomia)) a
double motif which could, interpreted differently, withdraw democraey
from autochtonic and homophyliac rootedness?" (Derrida 1997,103-
04). The withdrawal from rootedness can be learnt from I<höra, which
is pre-conceptual, a place that is neither present nor ideal, and as such
may open on to a possible politics, in which the position of the other
is unpredictable and left undetermined.8
The Parc Andre Citroen opened to the public in September
1993. The park evidences a discontinuous interplay between a traditional
reception of the landscape garden and another fundamentally different
conception. The traditional reacling is still possible in some parts of
the park (such as the "orangerie" pavillons and canals reminiscent of
the 17th century French formal garden), even though these traditions
are already inflected and parodic. For instance, the hothouses occupy
the dominant position formerly attributed to the mansion or palace,
and are "inhabited" by plants, not humans, while the canals do not run
along the axiallines of the formal model. element's own contribution
to the design of that park entailed devising what he calls a jardin en
mouvement ("garden in movement"), wruch puts into question the
prevision of the gardener by allowing the plants to grow of their own
accord, and calls for an active irruption of the visitor, who is asked to
contribute to the very appearance of the garden.9 Clement pinpoints
what constitutes the specificity of this space by linking the public
embrace of its potentialities with freedom: "Understood at first as a
space of liberty, it is occupied as such, that is to say, freely, with all the
questions that the use of a place whose rules are still unknown poses"
(Clement 1994, 66). In effect, liberty would be called for, like an open
invitation, by the very structure of the garden, which Clement defines
as "a scenographic unfolcling in time" (67).10 These two characteristics
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of the garden in movement -a spatio-temporal development, and
public liberty- entail that all speculations regarcling the garden
constantly need to be revised and never stabilize (67). Tbis position is
itself derived from Clement's understanding of the vegetal, as what
exceeds prevision, especially as far as human management is concerned.
In bis projects of gardens in movement, Clement gives free rein to
"the vagabond behavior" of plants when left unsupervised (Clement
1990, 64).11 In fallow land, for instance, vagabond plants do not keep
to the space initially assigned to them; they migrate of their own accord.
Guy Lecerf has pointed out the proximity of Clement's thinking of
movement to that of another designer of the turn of the century,
GertrudeJekyll, who associated colorwith the dynamies of the garden
(470). In her Colour Schemesfor the Flower Garden, Jekyll cliscusses what
she calls "vagrancy incidents" (134), wbich consist in the spontaneous
appearance of unplanned seedlings. Whereas the traclitional gardener
would consider the occurrence of an unpremeclitated plant to be
undesirable, both Jekyll and Clement reappraise the notion of design
as a preconceived space, and let vagrancy contribute to the (future)
shape of the garden. Vagrancy or Clement's "movement," if it is not
interfered with, entails that the landscape gets permanently modified.
By focusing on phenomena like fallow land or floods, that is to say by
privileging motion over stabilized form, Clement emphasizes that the
garden in movement, and indeed landscape in general, "carries within
it, at the moment when it is viewed, the clisappearance of the forms
that reveal it" (element 1995, 531). Deleuze and Guattari have linked
movement with becoming, in the sense of constant process:
"Movement becom[es] the process of absolute deterritorialization"
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 282). Clement's garden in movement
functions like a rhizomatic space: "[fhe rhizome] has neither beginning
nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from wbich it grows and wbich it
overspills" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987,21).
Gilles Deleuze's writings take place in the middle of an
interrogation of spatiality, or to put it more simply, they happen in
"the middle." It is indeed a constant trait in Deleuze not only to read a
thinker, as he does for instance in the case of Spinoza, "by way of the
middle" (Deleuze 1988, 122), butwhatis more, to "install [him]self on
this plane [of immanence]-wbich implies a mode of living, a way of
life" (122). This plane is not given in advance, but must be constructed
(123). Diagrammatics, rhizomatics, cartography, de- (or re-)
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territorialization, are markers which trace spatial and temporal lines.
But these markers also involve the "ethological" relation of bodies to
one another: "So an animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations
with the world" (125). In that respect, Fran~ois Zourabichvili notes
that ''The Deleuzian cogito is an 'I inhabit'" (13). In a dialogue with
Claire Parnet, Deleuze12 recapitulates the "assemblages" that "we"
(individuals, groups, socio-political fields) are: "we are made of lines"
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 69). These lines are different and
coextensive, they are "immanent, caught up in each other..., entangled"
(11), and rhizomatics, micropolitics, etc., would be names for the study
of these lines. Assemblages are segmented by molarities and
molecularities, and if at times he seems to oppose thereby "bistory" to
becomings, the former enveloping a plane of organization/
transcendence, and the latter a plane of consistence/immanence,
Deleuze insists that "the two [are] working in each other...there is no
dualism between the two planes" (86). In other words, for Deleuze,
the point is to think the other of the molar in terms that would not be
of opposition to it, because that moment would in fact duplicate the
Same.13 The only way out of dualism, and indeed out of the counting
and accounting of numbers, for multiplicity in Deleuze has nothing to
do with numbers, consists in displacing dualism "when one discovers
between the terms, whether two or more, a narrow pass like a border
[bordure] or frontier wruch will make oE the ensemble a multiplicity"
(85).
Deleuze's denunciation of dualism, or binary logic, or then
again of the "One that becomes two" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 5),
explains bis approach to numbers, and especially bis way of reading
the triade Since binaries do not escape a logic of duplication of the
One or the Same, the number three looks like the desirable third
interrupting that logic, but it does so only to the extent that the
interruption does not COllstitute an alternative to dualism/the One, or .
a dialectical outcome, but ruins counting and accounting. For instance,
in A ThousandPlateaus, writing or thought is deployed in three different
ways: the root-book or the tree as the in1age of a cosmos with a center
and unity; the fascicular root as the in1age of a chaosmos, of the world
as chaos; and the rhizome as subterranean sterns or bulbs and tubers,
a book-rhizome as an assemblage with the world (Deleuze and Guattari
1987, 5-6). Though apparently opposed, or because of their opposition,
both the root-book and the fascicular root are said to belong to the
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thought of the One. As for the rhizome, it neither contains nor counters
prevailing arborescent logic. For one thing, it "contains lines of
segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized..., as weil
as lines of deterritorialization" (9). But it is also fleeing elsewhere, out
of that logic. Therefore, when Deleuze mentions three lines-amolar
line, a molecular line, and the line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari 1983,
76ff)-, not only does his wavering as to the number of lines (93)
emphasize his awareness of a possible relapse into dualism; it also
enacts a way out of countingin order to think a numberless "multiplicity
of dimensions, lines, and directions" (86).14 For Deleuze, the escape
or way out is unexpected, unpredictable, it is what is called, among
other names, a line of flight. 1t is unexpected because it is not, but
becomes: is not given, but has to be traced. Deleuze insists that the line
of flight carries away (82), and that becoming is silent, happens
elsewhere, behind the thinker's back, "a third which always comes from
elsewhere" (82) .15
Deleuze and Guattari have written on the rhizome, but they
go further in claiming to write rhizomatically (Rhizome) A Thousand
Plateaus). Writing, or the book, has a relation to the world, a relation
which has been misconstrued as mimetic. Instead, for Deleuze and
Guattari, "the book forms a rhizome with the world" (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987,11), or the book is a becoming-world, in the specific
sense that "becoming" has for them, that is, a becoming-with and not
into something. Whether they talk about the rhizome or about
becoming, Deleuze and Guattari insist on the relation of heterogeneities
to the outside: "that which one becomes becomes no less than the one
that becomes" (305). Writing is rhizomatic or a rhizome-book (23)
and connects with the world to the extent that it is not an image of the
world. 1s the rhizome an other space, the space of the other? An
assemblage, a rhizome is a system with several characteristics, which,
however, defy representation, not because they are strictly speaking
unrepresentable, but because they are not already given, or they are
not, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest in the examples of the becoming-
wasp of the orchid, and the becoming-orchid of the wasp. At stake in
rhizomatic writing and immanence is another space, also for and of
the political: Becomings, micro-becomings allow for "another politics,
another time, another individuation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 70).16
Not without danger, however, and more than one danger.
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Deleuze and Guattari do not minimize the possible failure of
the process or of becoming: ''You may make a rupture, draw a line of
flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations
that restratify everything...from Oedipal resurgences to fascist
concretions" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 9). The danger of rigid lines
of segmentation is increased by the possibility of reterritorialization
or crystallization, and this danger is often called "fascisrn" (precisely or
loosely) by Deleuze and Guattari. The second line is not without danger
either, that of entering a "black hole" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 97)
from which no escape is possible. Moreover, the danger of the line of
flight is the most acute since it is "inherent in any line that escapes, in
any line of flight or creative deterritorialization: the danger of veering
toward destruction, toward abolition" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987,
299), an abolition and destruction that also affect others (Deleuze and
Guattari 1983, 99). Therefore every line has its dangers, which are
both accidental to, and part of the rhizome or assemblage of
multiplicities. These formulations of the rhizome have to be taken
together in their heterogenei~a heterogeneity that prevents totalization:
on the one hand, the attempt to think what is not already given, aspace
(that of politics, of writing, etc.) that would not reproduce the
preexisting. And on the other hand, the danger, which is not, however,
a failure of thinking the rhizome. In that respect, Deleuze insists that
there is no prescription for averting danger or any recipe explaining
how to face it successfully (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 108). At stake
in the rhizome is where and how to "trace a line of flight or of
deterritorialization which is at one with its own politics and its own
strategy" (103). That line is not pretraced, but must be invented,
experiments in socio-political fields must "baffle expectations" [dijouer
lesprivisions] (111).
At this juncture, an articulation, almost a translation, can be
posited between Deleuze's becoming (devenitJ and Derrida's to-come
(d-venitJ, both happening in a time/space that would arrive as the
unexpected, defeating the horizon of prevision. Both Derrida and
Deleuze make an incisive distinction between the future and the time
of the event, the latter being the temporality of "a-venir" or "devenir."
In Negotiations, for instance, Deleuze speaks of the difference between
becoming and history (170): ''What history grasps in an event is the
way it's actualized in particular circumstances; but the event in its
becoming escapes history" (170). In that interview he also asserts (as
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he also does in a dialogue with Claire Parnet) that "people's revolutionary
becoming" (171) has nothing to do with the future of the revolution.
And this difference is what allows for a new type of revolution, or in
other words, for the irruption of the ne"\\T. Zourabichvili emphasizes
that what interests Deleuze is to describe the temporality of that
irruption or of the event as such, not the temporality of "the new
situation or the new midclle, but of the between-two-middles" (74).
When he examines the implications of affirming becoming,
Zourabichvili adds that the temporal mode of becoming can only be
grasped "at the limit of the livable: it threatens the present and thereby
the identity of the subject who affirms it...: the other excludes me,
who will surge in my place" (75). This formulation will recall Derrida's
arrivant, "the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable
singularity of the arrivant," of the otherwho "comes before me, before
any present, thus before any past present, but also what, for that very
reason, comes from the future [aveni~ or as future [aveni~: as the very
coming of the event" (Derrida 1994, 28). For Deleuze as weil as for
Derrida, "this affirmation of the future differs from any anticipation"
(Zourabichvili 75), and no eventwould happen without this difference.17
Where Derrida U11.derscores what in the promise is inseparable from
the threat, Deleuze speaks of "coefficients of chance and danger"
involved in lines, spaces, and becomings (Deleuze 1995, 34). Derrida
and Deleuze certainly inflect differently, in their respective idiom, the
unforeseeableness of the event, but in each case, its unfolding has a
"concrete" impact, as Deleuze shows. Derrida's urgent call for justice,
for a "democracy to-come;' and Deleuze's "ethology" -as he writes
in his study on Spinoza, "no one knows ahead of time the affects one
is capable of; it is a long affair of experimentation" (125)- are not
only thoughts of another temporallty but also of other topologies.
In aremarkable way; Clement's garden in movement brings
together the reflectiolls of Deleuze and Derrida. As we have already
mentioned, the very structure of Clement's garden emphasizes
becoming. The lack of stability and cohesiveness in the location is
construed by Clement as "a fugitive encounter that illuminates a piece
of time" (Clement 1990, 99). If the garden always differs from itself, it
can also force the recognition of that self-difference in the onlooker,
which makes familiarity with the space difficult for the visitor. In a
sense, therefore, the park is still expected to elicit a response from the
visitor, and much is expected from the disorientation that it will induce
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at first. Above all, Clement makes this response accidental, not essential
to the landscape. In describing an ecosystem that can include human
beings, but does also minimize man's assumed centrality, Clement talks
of aspace which is indifferent to man's gaze, and which can live on
autonomously, not only without man, but also after him. Thus,
Clement's garden in movement also prevents an autochtonic reading
of the space of the garden. The public park is not construed as an
exclusive place, or a place of exclusion. The garden refutes modes of
appropriation and functions instead in the way Jacques Derrida has
analyzed in his reading of kh6ra, as a non-place, impassive, amorphous,
which, however, gives place. By insisting on the undeterminable
movement of the garden, Clement points to another ethics of
inhabiting space, one that remains unplanned and left open to
possibilities. This reflection determines in turn a political relation that
Clement derives from "the ethical field" of landscape (Clement 2004,
28). Writing in the form of a manifesto in favor of "the Third-
Landscape," in explicit reference to Emmanuel Sieyes's revolutionary
demands in What is the Third-Estate? (13), Clement delineates aspace
which metonymically represents neither power nor submission. The
Third-Landscape structurally designates what is at process in fallow
land, or in what he also calls abandoned land ("Je de/aiss!') , in "reserves,"
which are subtracted from an anthropic territory, in SUfi wherever
human decision is withdrawn, bringing out "the undecided mode of
the Third-Landscape" (9). As far as plants are concerned, the Third-
Landscape constitutes both arefuge and "the location of possible
invention" (30). In his elaboration of gardens in movement, Clement
was already attentive to the possibility of unprogrammed biologieal
invention, happening (or not) by chance encounters. In this essay, he
explicitly draws the political and ethical consequences of inhabiting
such aspace. First, the stakes of the Third-Landscape are not territorial
(27). The determination of form is left open, as much as the relation
to time. The Third-Landscape can be planned, but remains
unpredictable in time (49), a formulation which may recall Eisenman's
and Derrida's interpretation of La Villette, where the model remains
short of the mode of reading and inhabiting the location. Likewise for
element, the user of the Third-Landscape cannot be anticipated
through an institution (architects, politicians, and others). Rather, diat
space includes, as he apdy notes, "reserves and questions" (61). In that
sense, the Third-Landscape indicates an ethical position that can be
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generalized beyond it (and in fact, element often posits a planetary
scope for le delaisse [for instance, 25]): the absence of program also
gives rise to chances of existence (50), incalculable biological invention
nourishes becoming (56), while undecided space also promotes a non-
appropriable "common space of the future" (63).
If landscape architects have been "receptive" to the thought
of Derrida and Deleuze, it is because both think time/space in a way
which does not sidestep what Derrida names "unconditional
hospitality" (Derrida 2000, 147), involving "giving place to a concrete
politics and ethics" (149). Not only is the temporality and form of the
place interrogated by landscape designers in the light of Derrida's kh6ra
or Deleuze's rhizome. The discrepancy between what remains
unconditional in hospitality and its actualized conditions (or lack thereof)
also triggers an ethical reflection in which public places perform a
crucial role. Without foreclosed modes of inhabiting thenl, with an
emphasis on process and non-totalization, public parks indeed provide,
for more reasons than one, a breath of fresh air within the city.
University oJ Florida
Notes
1 In Chora L Works, the architect Peter Eisenman gives an example
of suspended interiority: "I once did a house with a room that you could look
into but that you could never enter; you could feel its presence in every other
room of the house. This had the effect of always making one feel outside of
the house, because the ultimate interior was inaccessible" (34).
2 The visitor's "reception" of such a possibility in architecture
depends first on defamiliarization, which is likely to trigger the invention of
new modes of inhabitation. One example of that process can be found in
Bernard Tschumi's notes on his design of the Parc de La Villette: "Exploding
programmatic requirements throughout the site onto a regular grid of points
of intensity (a mark, a trace). Hence the different types of activities are first
isolated and then distributed on the site, often encouraging the combination
of apparendy incompatible activities (the running track passes through the
piano-bar inside the tropical greenhouse)" (Tschumi 1987,4).
3 Leonard Lawlor's Thinking through French Philosop~ (especiallychapter
8), and Paul Patton and John Protevi's edited volume, Between Deleuze and
Derrida, are examples of such an undertaking. In Architedurefrom the Outside,
Elizabeth Grosz investigates each philosopher's contribution to "think[ingl
architecture differendy" (59), with more emphasis, however, on Deleuze (see
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in particular chapters 4 and 6), whose relation to architecture must be inferred,
since unlike Derrida, he did not direcdy participate in any architectural project.
4 In Deleuze and the Political, Paul Patton also argues that there is "a
strange proximity" between Deleuze and Derrida (15). EIsewhere, Tamsin
Lorraine explores "a line of flight between the two [Deleuze and Derrida]"
(patton and Protevi 31). It is probably not accidental that when a link is made
between the two corpuses, it so often relies, at least initially; on a Deleuzean
idiom (zone of proximity, line of flight), to address what brings them together
and divides them at the same time. What Lorraine (31) immediately invokes
as a difference of reticence with regard to ontology on the part of Deleuze
Oess reticent) and Derrida (more reticent) may pardy explain why Deleuzean
concepts more readily suggest themselves when assembling the two. Certainly,
Derrida's "quasi" concepts relating to time/space, such as difßrance and trace,
are thought "without presence," thus withdrawing themselves from the
possibility of re-presentation. However, with becomingand rhizome, for instance,
Deleuze complicates, to say the least, the notion of a representable topography.
5 Quotations from ](hora are taken from the English translation of
that text in Derrida's On the Name, and not from the different translation
found in Chora L WOrks. The citations from Chora L WOrks refer to the
transcripts of the meetings between Eisenman, Derrida, and others.
6 See Plato's Timaeus on Kh6ra: "but now the argument compels us
to try to describe in words a form that is difficult and obscure" (49a); "but we
shall not be wrong if we describe it as invisible and formless, all-embracing,
possessed in a most puzzling way of intelligibility, yet very hard to grasp"
(51b); "third, space...which is apprehended without the senses by a sort of
spurious reasoning and so is hard to believe in-we look at it indeed in a kind
of dream" (52b). See Derrida's commentary (Derrida 1995, 90).
7 Deleuze's statement, "More important than thought, there is 'what
gives to think'" (Deleuze 1972, 161), performs a reflecrion related to Derrida's
on "giving" and "receiving"-in Deleuze, what matters is neither actualized
nor an outcome, but gives place. See also What is Philosopf?y?: "one does not
think without becoming something else" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 42).
8 The geographieal position of La Villette joins Paris to the suburbs
(Tschumi 2000, 57), lieuwith banlieu~an intermediate location, neither central
nor excluding.
9 Tschumi also discusses movement as "one of the generating factors
of architecture" (Tschumi 2000, 226), and is particularly interested in the
interaction of "vectorized movement" (such as elevators) with static spaces,
noting that the latter can be activated "through the motion of the bodies that
populate them" (226), thus emphasizing, like Clement, the irruptive role of
the human body within the ensemble.
10 For an assessment of Clement's "garden in movement" in relation
to other parts of the park, I take the liberty of referring to the concluding
63
BRIGI1TE WELTMAN-ARON
chapter of my On Other Grounds, which begins to draw connections between
Clement, Deleuze, and Derrida.
11 In contradistinction, therefore, with tradition's assessment of
plants: In Plato's Timaeus, the plant is said to be "always entirely passive...So
it is a creature with a life of its own, but it cannot move and is fixed and
rooted because it has no self-motion" (105).
12 Throughout this essay, "Deleuze" will often stand for "Deleuze
and Guattari;' or "Deleuze and Parnet" as weIl. The writing signed Deleuze
always points to alterity, to a traversed authorship, an ethical practice which
enacts rhizomatic writing. Examples abound, but I will only mention two
instances from Dialogues, signed by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet. No
markers ever indicate who speaks when. The separation between paragraphs
does not point with any certainty to any of the speakers. In the middle of
what can be taken as the recapitulation of Deleuzian concepts (dei
reterritorialization), we come to this passage: ''What do these words mean,
words that Guattari invents..." (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 88). Even more
strikingly, the text does attribute by name one note, and one note only, to
"G.D" (and this specific appearance of Deleuze as G.D. has been omitted in
the translation) [99; Dialogues 167]. In Negotiations, Deleuze also says: "Even
when you think you're writing on your own [a un], you're always doing it with
someone else you can't always name" (141).
13 For instance, when they discuss women's politics, Deleuze and
Guattari suggest a way of traversing the molar in a way that would touch on
itwhile altering it: while they concede that it is necessary for women to conduct
molar politics, they fmd "danger" in this thinking (in a sense of danger that I
will return to). Instead, molecularwomen's politics would consist in "slipp[ing]
into molar confrontations, pass [ing] under or through them" (Deleuze and
Guattari 276).
14 Deleuze writes in his letter-preface toJean-Clet Martin's Variations,
that "'Rhizome' is the best word to designate multiplicities" and that "One
Thousand Plateaus is devoted to multiplicities in themselves (becomings, lines,
etc.)" (8).
15 A comparable image is invoked when Deleuze talks of movement
in Cinema 1: ''You can bring two instants or two positions together to inftnity;
but movement will always occur in the interval between the two, in other
words behind your back" (1).
16 Paul Patton calls Anti-Oedipus and One Thousand Plateaus "overtly
political books" (1), and "entirelywork[s] of political philosophy" (9).
17 It is true that in Logic of Sense, Deleuze writes of an event that
would be "willed" (149), which seems in contradiction with an affirmation
without anticipation. But in this section, Deleuze speaks against the
"resentment of the event", to which he opposes another ethical stance, that
of a body which "wills now not exactly what occurs, but something in that
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which occurs, something yet to come [d veni~ which would be consistent with
what occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity:
the Event" (149).
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